

Different phases, different logics: nationalism and globality at two turns of century¹

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1. INTRODUCTION

The article explores the nature of national identity and national movements in Europe with particular focus on mass/elite configurations in the era of the nation-building process (19th and part of the 20th century – *phase 1*) and in the present-day global age (*phase 2*). The pivotal reference points will be the two "turns of century": from the 19th to the 20th, and from the 20th to the 21st. This also implies that although the two phases, understood as broad historical processes, comprise different sub-phases (in varying national configurations), the argument in the paper is predominantly focused on a comparison between the state of nationalism and its relations with "global" processes in the late 19th and the late 20th century, respectively.

The objectives are, first, to shed light on two phases in the history of nationalism where the interaction between "the national" and "the global" is crucial, in order to establish if it is true, as some contend, that globalization is nothing new and we have seen most of it before (*e.g.* Hirst & Thompson, 1996). And, second, to foreground specific similarities and differences in the mass/elite nexus (and its links with national movements) at a time when the modern nation-state was coming into its own and another when (some say) it is in a state of decline.

In this light, the paper sets out to:

- analyze the normative status of national movements and national discourse in the two phases (section 2);

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- identify the underlying political or ideological rationale and the principal agents of nationalism (key distinction: "peasants into Frenchmen" *versus* "the revolt of the elites"), and in this context discuss the material *versus* the non-material aspects of national movements (key distinction: functional *versus* existential aspects of belonging) (section 3);
- contrast the symbolic rationale of national movements in *phase 1* with their status and formats today, in the context of the different roles of memory and mission in the two phases (section 4);
- finally reflect on the different discourses and objectives of racism, anti-immigration movements and time-specific constructions of Others, with respect to interests, grievances and visions of interactions between national egoism and international collaboration. In this context the impact of war and war talk – their presence or absence, legitimacy or non-legitimacy, old or new discursive forms – will be addressed (section 5).

The argument has a predominant theory-developing perspective, but draws on cases and illustrative material from different national European contexts.

2. MODALITIES AND NORMATIVITIES OF NATIONALISM

Phase 1: The most basic point to make is that in the late 19th century nationalism and national movements in Europe enjoyed widespread legitimacy. In spite of their different forms and manifestations both within and across different countries, they had increasingly come to be seen as a civilizing force, as a symbolic and material vehicle of modernity. To be a "nationalist" or a "patriot" was not, as in Dr Johnson's days, a euphemism for a scoundrel, or, as in our own age, a rather aggressive or wistfully nostalgic label, but was becoming the epithet of modernist, future-oriented respectability – even if some nationalisms would be better described as "statisms" (like Bismarck's Germanism or British Imperial Nationalism) and their driving force was less patriotic love of country and popular representation than hard-nosed reasons of state.² Nevertheless even such statist and imperialist ambitions played themselves out within the framework of organic nationalism. "The national" was positive ideology, representing an ideal unity of the social, the cultural and the political – in fact, of people and state, though the "nationalization of

² In the light of the resistance to nationalism mounted by the 1st Socialist International (1893) one ought to add: and bourgeois.

the masses" (Mosse, 1975) had reached different levels and had penetrated differently into the hearts and minds of different social and regional sections of the population in the various European countries. But at least at the level of elite discourse and agenda-setting political and popular movements, the national paradigm was widely accepted both as a legitimate form of social, political and economic reference and as a powerful motive force of a burgeoning democratic modernity.

In terms of the three-type division of nationalism into imperative, indicative and subjunctive forms that I have outlined elsewhere (Hedetoft, 1995), nationalism in the late 19th century in Europe oscillated between imperative and subjunctive modalities. On the one hand it was a top-down, state-induced and territoriality motivated political and cultural organizing principle – figuratively speaking an edict by the powers-that-be to "the people" to fall emotionally and allegiance-wise in line with its ruling cadres. This is the conservative version of nationalism, which ultimately produced European racism and fascism. On the other side of the medal we find the national imaginary, the push from below toward national-ethnic homogeneity, toward fulfilling both Rousseau's ideal of direct representation and Heine's nocturnal dreams of Germany.³ This is nationalism in the subjunctive mode: if only it were so...; and could it come to be...; and were it so, things would be perfect. Of course, "state" enters into this vision too, but from the other side, as a needed instrument to keep the nation together and protect it from outside threats, and also as symbolic representation of the (supposed) unity that it springs from. Importantly, neither of the two modes can confidently take the existence of nation-states and national identities for granted. There's an incipient morality of nationalism in the making, whose prime virtues are intra-societal solidarity, a commitment to sacrifice and heroism in the national interest, and a belief in the superior qualities of one's own nation (more often than not racially justified). But as yet there's no solidified Grand Narrative of the National, nor has the narrative transformed into mainstream "banality" (Billig, 1995). Nationalism, in different combinations, is therefore a mix, sometimes a very uneasy one, between (on the one hand) imperially or aristocratically inspired centralist directivity and state- and market-driven interests, and (on the other hand) popular-nationalist ardour to create "one's own" institutions of power, bottom-up pressure on states for cultural and linguistic concessions (sometimes to the point of demanding secession from an established

³ In other words, this distinction, between imperative and subjunctive, is not the equivalent of the – imagined more than real – difference between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism.

"empire" state), and claims-making movements for democratic rights and recognition.

The specific configurations of imperative and subjunctive modalities and the consequent national movements depend a lot on the avenue taken to construct national modernity in particular countries or regions. Theodor Schieder's suggestion that we distinguish between a territorially incorporative, a unificatory and a secessionist path (Schieder, 1992) is analytically and heuristically useful in this respect. In the first category we find *e.g.* England and France, with state structures, institutions and territorial boundaries reasonably in place before the "advent" of nationalism-structures, institutions and boundaries that undergo a politically and socially transformative process in the nation-building phase, violent and fragmentary in France, smoother and more "continuous" in England, but all the same offer an established framework to tap into, reform or even revolutionize. By the turn of the 20th century, political establishments of both countries are engaged in similar problems, *i.e.* how – on the basis of centralized administrative structures – to nationalize the masses of colonial metropolises and win over the hearts and minds of people(s) within their territories. On the part of nationalist elites and movements, these attempts involved both "external" and "internal" colonialisms, but in the perspective of nationalism the latter is the more important: how to overcome regional separatisms and local attachments or at least subordinate them to and make them functional for the national cause. In this format, nationalism is imperative first, and only secondarily subjunctive.

The second type, unificatory nationalism, is what we find in *e.g.* Germany and Italy. This is a nationalism and an interaction between nationalist and statist movements marked by violent and discontinuous showdowns between representatives of the "political imperative" (institutional modernism) and cultural-visionary representatives of the national imaginary, as witnessed by the German conflict between a *Klein-* and a *Grossdeutschland*, or between the national vision of a Mazzini and a Garibaldi in Italy. Here nationalism is imperative and subjunctive at the same time, but organized in parallel and constantly engaged in a cultural and political struggle to define "rightful" territory, proper institutions, criteria for national citizenship and belonging, and popular influence on state and government (O'Leary et al, 2001). Toward the end of the century, in both countries the champions of the *raison d'état* are at the helm of state, but they are also losing out in the wider intra-European competition for global resources and influence, all of this pointing ahead to

the fascist trajectory (where the imperative mode of nationalism is absolute) followed in both countries after WW I.⁴

The secessionist type, characteristic of most Central and East European national paths, represents the reverse of this. Here nationalism (mimetic in the sense that it looks "west" for role models and support) is predominantly subjunctive, represented by ambitious social and regional groups excluded from or at least marginalized in relation to the opportunity structures offered to the people of "the center", and therefore locked into a more or less hopeless fight against absolutist and agrarian-based "multicultural" empires like those of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. Where, in unificatory nationalism, imperative and subjunctive nationalisms have each their own kind of programs, visions and social movements, in this third type there's a total rupture: the state imperative runs counter to any modern vision of nationalism, and subjunctive nationalism feeds on a combination of powerlessness, grievance and sentiments steeped in righteousness. Only through external intervention (WW I, the dissolution of the three great empires and the adoption of national self-determination as an international norm) did some of the nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe (and the Irish Free State!) achieve secession.

Nationalism in this phase in Europe represents a comprehensive "project", politico-economic as well as cultural and social, to overcome and reshape the colonial and dynastic forms of "globality" which characterized the 19th century. The phase marks the entry of the people on the social and political stage, both as a material driving force and ideological rampart of political ambitions. The normative justification for this nationalism is moral and universalistic (notwithstanding the particularistic thrust of all nationalisms): sovereignty in its popular manifestation; the illegitimacy of arbitrary aristocratic and despotic rule (in other parts of the world this turned into colonial independence movements); the defense against international socialism; enlightenment rationality; the appropriateness of self-governance; the freedom of the individual; but also (enter particularism!) the immorality or inferiority of the nationalism of the Other(s) (see section 5 below). In this last respect, national morality was to a significant extent buttressed by "scientific" racism and mainstream political philosophy.

⁴ And particularly in Germany defining their nationalism – policies as well as discourses – as a counter-measure to international socialism.

Phase 2: In the meantime, something important has happened to the normative currency and broadly based legitimacy of nationalism and national movements. On the one hand, nationalism today exists in the indicative mode: it is there, has a political container (the nation-state) which functions as a naturalized reference-point and umbrella for citizens' national identities, and pivots around a series of "banalities" (Billig, 1995) that more or less consciously frame people's social and cultural lives and feelings of belonging – thus conditioning their practice as well as their mental dispositions. In a sense, it is also subjunctive, since both people and elites generally harbour images of a better, fairer, more humane and also more functional nation-state, and often cultivate national traditions and cherish wistful memories of the national past. Nationalism, in the meaning of imagined communities, still has a firm grip on the popular imaginary.

On the other hand, however, this specific modality nexus between national indicativeness and subjunctiveness is lined with a sceptical edge that detracts from the normative acceptability of nationalism and makes "national movements" a somewhat doubtful proposition to engage in. This "legitimacy gap" is primarily caused by five factors in different configurations: the WW II legacy and the linkage of nationalism and international aggressiveness; the functional dilution of the welfare state; the backward-looking tendency of national identities; the globalization and Europeanization of the core elites and the partial decoupling of interests from identities; and the fact that ideological nationalism and national movements have been discursively appropriated by anti-immigrant, anti-European and anti-globalizing groups at the margins of the social or political continuum. (For more on these specifics, see the next section.)

The most important general point is probably that nationalism is no longer an indubitably legitimate and forward-looking ideology for the progressive historical elites in Europe (the situation is slightly different in the United States).⁵ Rather it has developed (some would probably say degraded) into being a repository for historical sentimentalism and backward-looking nostalgia. In a very real sense, nationalism is somehow dated. In the current climate of transnationality and globalization – *i.e.* elite networking across bor-

⁵ Because in the only remaining superpower, nationalism, as a unique mix of "ethnic", "cultural" and "political" belonging, is not just still legitimate, but to a large extent still carried by a close linkage to militant, war-derived images and a widespread cult of military sacrifices and civic heroism, all embedded in an American belief in the manifest destiny of the USA and its global mission as a defender of civilizational values. See also section 5, *phase 2* below.

ders – it no longer or only very partially contains a tenable vision for the future in economic, social or political terms.⁶ There is a significant process of "uneven development" at work here, between the pervasive and continuing survival of nationalism as sentiment and popular identity, and on the other hand its "functional degradation" ("re-functionalization" might be a better term) in economic, welfare-dependent and sovereignty-oriented terms – if, say, compared with the material and ideological workings or the welfare-state regimes constructed during the first 25 years after WW II.

Increasingly nationalism and nationalist discourses encapsulate and articulate a series of *defensive* dimensions: a receptacle of sentimental attachments, protector against (too much) transnationality, safeguard against the decoupling of national masses from their elected elites, barrier against unwelcome immigration, display case of moral virtues and superior qualities (*e.g.* in the sports arena), and a space of historically constructed homeness and rootedness. Whereas these powerful parameters of nationalism attempt to retain the nation-state in a format that can be imagined as traditional, enduring and relatively stable, the factual interface between the nation-state and the global arena, on which it is increasingly dependent for its functionality, by and large contradicts this musealized stereotype. As in *phase I*, nationalism – now less legitimate and carried much less uniformly by the elites of historical progress – attempts to resist, reshape or constrain the consequences of "globality" for the nation-state and its national identity. The crucial difference is that where in the late 19th century nationalism carried the ball of history and the core elites were unflinchingly on its side, contemporary "cosmopolitan" elites now pursue "national interests" through avenues that cohere in a piecemeal fashion only with the defensive-nostalgic nexus of indicative and subjunctive nationalism.

It is the progress of nationalism itself throughout the 20th century and its victory over 19th century "globality" which have produced a different configuration of global-national vectors that increasingly privileges this new burgeoning globality and imposes on the nation-state a requirement to trans-substantiate (*e.g.* by going transnational), if it is to remain functional and adequate at all. This new configuration is well reflected in the progress of International Relations theories from the early to the late 20th century, from

⁶ This does not mean that national elites pursue supranational interests, but that in their pursuit of national interests they are increasingly compelled to apply transnational remedies. Hence the potential decoupling of "national interest" and "national identity", "elites" and "masses" in *e.g.* EU member states.

Realism (giving priority to the supremacy, power and sovereignty of the nation-state) through Neo-Realism (maintaining the nation-state as the central "unit", but acknowledging the "system" as overdetermining) to Liberal Institutionalism and different variants of Constructivism (in both of which trans- and supranational forces as well as the liminalities of the traditional interaction between the National and the Global are conspicuous) (see e.g. Czempiel & Rosenau, 1989; George, 1994).

In this context nationalism (as identity), deprived of its original *raison d'être* and instruments, acquires a jaded patina of socio-psychological compensation and consolation for the less privileged masses and the less upbeat elites as well. Evidence of this can be found, *inter alia*, in the fact that even the most nationally minded champions and ideologues of the sovereign national welfare state cannot but argue their case through discourses of *international* commitment: whenever they have an axe to grind with the "globalizers", they rarely take explicit exception with the global perspective inherent in the opposing vision as such, but rather criticize this vision for not being *genuinely* international.

Without wanting at this point to enter into the specifics of the question, it must be emphasized that this diagnosis of the transformations under way is couched and conceived in highly general terms. In other words, it does not explicitly address – but it does recognize – the fact that these developments have assumed and still assume different (political, discursive, affective) forms in different nation-state contexts. The processes are different in, say, Germany (where WW II immediately led to a questioning of nationalism), Spain (where the same process has taken much longer, e.g. due to Francoism and regional nationalism), Britain (a state of national pride and wartime glory, where national identity and nationalistic discourses are still pervasive, vying with cosmopolitanism of the New Labour brand) and Denmark (where small-nation exceptionalism and welfare-state mentality still coalesce to produce widespread scepticism toward global and European processes). And these are no more than examples; all nation-states follow each their own road toward (a recognition of) the new configuration and its inherent normativities.⁷ But the logic of global processes is, by their very nature, that they all

⁷ One of the semantic/semiotic manifestations of these normativities is evident in the meanings and uses of the distinction between "national" and "nationalist", usually with the former as the overtly denotative and neutral designation and the latter as the connotative and value-charged one (normally the value assignment is negative). Following this logic, it is fine to

have to follow one of these roads. This necessity springs from the rationale of the changing interaction.

3. RATIONALE AND AGENTS OF NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

Phase I: The question now is how and why we come to witness a change from a phase typified by both an agenda-setting nationalistic discourse and a corresponding social and cultural, elite-driven process of "peasants into Frenchmen" (as Eugen Weber's (1976) well-known work called it) to something like Christopher Lasch's "revolt of the elites" and their betrayal of national democracy (Lasch, 1995), in an age where nationalism has gradually seen its absolute legitimacy being questioned.

There is obviously a deep connectedness between the two parts of this question – the social on the one hand, the normative on the other. To a large extent, the legitimacy of nationalism and nationalist discourses in the early phase can be accounted for by the gradual confluence of various elite substrata behind the cause of the National and their concerted attempts to disseminate nationalism to "the people" (which is both a discursive reference point of nationalist agitation and a *de facto* social construction of the same). Inversely, the "progressiveness" of these strata resided in their embracing nationalism both as ideology, political program and cultural strategy, and, of course, in the fact that, in spite of hitches and glitches which detracted from its reputation, it proved a resounding success worldwide. And as regards our own age, the more doubtful and certainly less hegemonic standing of nationalism must be related to its more ambiguous functionality for progressive elites and their correspondingly more ambiguous and complex discourses of identity, purpose and instruments. In other words, we must recognize an endogenous structural relationship between legitimacy and normativity on the one hand, and the teleology and discourses of what I prefer to term "core elites" on the other. The correlation is central but also, in a sense, begs the question, since it does not answer the question of causality, *i.e.* how the two factors are related and why elite discourses of legitimacy have changed – unless, of course, one's approach is voluntaristic, identifying "causality" in the historical whims and arbitrary preferences of particular resourceful and

pursue "national interests" or to have a "national identity" as long as these are not articulations of "nationalist" inclinations.

powerful personalities (cultural, intellectual and political). However, without doubting the significant, even indispensable role of such historical actors (Brass, 1991; Hroch, 1985; Kappeler, 1992; Eugen Weber, 1976), this is not a tenable theoretical position (not even in a constructivist framework), since it neglects and ignores important "systemic" and institutional factors. We need therefore to unearth other and more general reasons for the change from what could heuristically be termed nationalist modernity to global postmodernity. In this sub-section, the focus will be on the former.

There is obviously no need to reiterate the important insights of scholars like Gellner (1983), Greenfeld (1992), Hroch (1985), Max Weber (1948) and others into the modernizing functionalities of 19th century nationalism in economic, social and political terms, but rather to capture the essence and synthetic meaning of their work as regards the change under scrutiny in this paper. At the level of simple description, the nationalizing developments at work in the late 19th century can be formulated as elite-driven processes to construct relatively autonomous, territorially bounded political and economic units, whilst in the process reshaping the social groupings within those boundaries into "national peoples", in other words overcome internal divisiveness, create horizontal and vertical homogeneities, and thus push not just industrialization and the market economy forward, but also consolidate and expand the power base of the nation-state in the making – both domestically and in the larger world.

The significant development as compared with earlier stages of nationalism, where "top-down" and "bottom-up", state-carried and imaginatively conceived nationalisms and corresponding elites and strategies vied with each other, and where what Greenfeld (1992) has called the nationalist transvaluation process (learning through mimesis and *ressentiment*) was at work as a shaper and disseminator of nationalism, is that in the late 19th century the nationalizing process had started to emancipate itself from its economic, social and cultural underpinnings and to assume an independent international and political rationale. Where hitherto only a few states had developed a nation and a nationalism for themselves, the situation was different around the turn of the century.⁸ And more importantly, where up until then states had by and large seen their primary goal to be the establishment and consolidation of the requisite conditions of the nation-state, at the turn of the century

⁸. The world, including Europe, was fundamentally asymmetrical in these terms: while Heine was still dreaming of Germany in the night, England's colonially based nationalism was far advanced.

the relationship was beginning to be reversed: the national economies and their immanent rationale were being harnessed to political and imperial objectives in most European states, and the nationalist agitation of political elites was directed at the masses not just in order to make them good and law-abiding citizens in a domestic framework, but to construct strong political identities that clearly distinguished between "us" and "them" and which could be called upon in situations of national crisis and war. Clearly not all nationalist processes ran in parallel, and there are exceptions due to "uneven developments", time lags, or other circumstances – e.g. in Denmark, where the defeat to Prussia in 1864 had led to a domestic focus on the economic trajectories for a modernization of the Danish society and a retreat from international involvement.⁹ In general, however, the most significant crucible for the creation of European nationalism as an all-societal and all-encompassing phenomenon of political, cultural and existential identity were the fundamentally imperial processes of international competition and mutual grievances in Europe between c. 1880 and 1914, the concomitant political discourses of national history, memory, glory and future goals, and the acceptance by the peoples of the soldiery virtues they were asked to internalize and demonstrate.¹⁰ War – real or imagined – proved to be an invaluable nationalist mobilizer, and the image of particular national self-identities became virtually inseparable from the mental construction and cultural representations of the Negative Other. Thus the pacific, non-exclusivist images of national character and culture propounded by Herder, Kant, Locke, Goldsmith and other intellectuals in the age of Enlightenment and Romanticism fell prey to the more ferocious "models" put forward (or inspired) by people like Hobbes, Arndt, Treitschke and Hegel – and their political incarnations, Napoleon, Bismarck, Disraeli, and so forth.

I do not want to be misunderstood: I am not arguing that imperial ambitions and inter-state competition are the exhaustive explanation for nationalism and

⁹ A central figure in these developments in Denmark was N.F.S. Grundtvig, priest, writer and politician combined, one of the founding fathers of the Danish High School Movement and an eloquent and influential cultural personality. His strong views on the strengths and virtues of "Danishness" provided the source for an entire national (cultural and social) ideology, known today as "Grundtvigianism". Though a major part of its intellectual inspiration was German, it was and is very articulate on the needs to look "inward" and cultivate allegedly specific Danish values (such as the People's Democracy – *Folkestyre* – and Political Egalitarianism).

¹⁰ Obvious in as diverse processes as Baden-Powell's boy scout movement in Britain, eugenics movements all over Europe, nationalist sports movements and organizations for the masses, and the virtues and values prioritized highly in mass-educational curricula.

national identities. On the contrary, they would not have been possible had the necessary economic, socio-cultural and legal-philosophical groundwork not been put place previously; in addition, there are undoubtedly valid economic and political reasons for nation-states and nationalism independently of the processes on which I focus here, reasons that constitute the explanatory framework for the transition of the individual from the status of "subject" to that of democratic "citizen". What I do argue, however, is that in the late 19th century and for some time to come, agenda-setting European states, having emancipated themselves from and subordinated "civil society" to their own relatively independent purposes, developed an emphatic and thoroughgoing exclusionary interest in promoting the national identities of their citizens and a powerful nation/state integrative compact due to the teleology they were almost all pursuing: colonizing the remains of the globe, retaining imperial rule, combating socialism at home and abroad, harnessing the economy to military purposes, keeping a cautious eye on one's European neighbours, entering into the most suitable alliances, etc. This imparted to nationalism and national identity (then mostly referred to as "national characters") an unquestioned and historically unprecedented legitimacy, since they were key to success in a struggle which *per se* had little to do with the national fervour of romantic imaginings.

If this is valid, then it should sensitize us not just to the historical interconnectedness of democratic and more totalitarian developments in modern European history, but also to the relativity and contingency of nationalism in its European form. It may not, as I argued above, be the result of individual whim and subjective choices, but in light of the lessons later learnt by European political elites as regards the (in)adequacy and counter-productivity of the colonialist competitive strategies employed prior to WW I as well their destructive inter-war results, neither should they be treated as historically ineluctable imperatives. Different political strategies might have produced different results, less belligerent and exclusionary nationalisms – or none at all. Thus, also the "progressiveness" of nationalism as an instrument of late 19th century modernization warrants a closer critical look – though this is a project in its own right which cannot be undertaken here.

Phase 2: In a sense, this phase both repeats and reverses the late-19th century experience in interesting ways. It has already been argued that whereas this latter turn marked an attempt by elite-driven, exclusionary nationalisms to reinvent the geographically limited and politically decentered globality of the 19th century in national terms and with national meaning, the late 20th cen-

tury in many ways represents the opposite turn: from nationalism to globalism, or, some would argue, from an exclusionary to a cosmopolitan form of nationalism – a process where the core elites seem to forge ahead with a global project implying a reinterpretation of sovereignty, a re-functionalization of national borders and a refiguration of the nation/state compact, whilst more "populist" elites both inside and outside the party-political landscape try to halt the slide toward globality and stick with the "old" order, or at least their perception of what things used to be like.¹¹

This process can be analyzed as the inevitable abolition of the nation-state and the advent of the "machine" of Empire, as argued by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their book entitled *Empire* (2000). The rationale is then the overarching logic of capitalism and its ever more expansive and hegemonic subsumption (or control) of all dimensions and spheres of life, a logic which demands that politics move beyond both nationalism and institutionalized inter-nationalism and assume an unmediated global "interventionist" form, legitimated by "exceptional" crisis situations (like the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the interventions in ex-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, etc.), which in fact are becoming more like the normal state of affairs.

This perspective is undoubtedly valid in a number of ways, particularly in its insistence that there is a close link between the fate of the nation-state and its functionality (or the reverse) for the progress of the political economy of capitalism. In brief form, Hardt and Negri argue that national sovereignty has declined dramatically because it no longer serves the interests of global business and is therefore being supplanted by a more global form of sovereignty through the creation of what they term Empire. To reinterpret them in the present context: whereas nationalism in the late 19th century worked well as the instrument and container of capitalist modernism, it is no longer functional and requires new forms of control and regulation – not a new imperialism (which is a creation of states), but an empire beyond states.

¹¹ By this term I mean to include intellectual and political personalities – Right as well as Left – whose resistance to the impending "dissolution" of the nation-state capitalizes on images and discourses of the "national soul", "*Volksgesit*", "ethnic roots" etc., and who in addition appeal directly to "the people" by proposing populist legislation (like stricter immigration controls) to ensure the "survival" of the national culture and identity. They become part of the elites if and when they become integrated into the established structures of power and opinion-formation. As far as their sociological origins are concerned, there seems to be little apparent regularity (between e.g. Haider, Schönhuber, Pia Kjærsgaard, Le Pen, Bossi and so forth).

One of the drawbacks to this kind of analysis of the ongoing turn of paradigm is *partly* that it does not identify the agents and institutions of "empire" clearly enough. "Empire" remains a rather mystical being, almost a political "invisible hand". *Partly* that it is too reductive and deterministic in its assumptions of a direct link between business ("base"?) and politics ("superstructure"?), along lines eerily reminiscent of some of the less productive sides of Althusserian structural Marxism. And *partly* that it does not properly investigate the changing roles and permutations of nationalism (probably because, like the nation-state, it is seen to be in inevitable decline), and hence is not concerned with taking discrete looks at nationalisms in different regions of the world, such as Europe. Put bluntly, this analysis and others like it overstates its case by reducing multi-layered global processes almost to the state of crude stereotypes.

It seems to be a more fitting starting point to contend that European nationalism in this global age, while definitely undergoing a significant transformation process, finds itself between illegitimacy and panacea. On the one hand, it is being robbed of a number of the functions it was meant to serve and which were imparted to it some hundred years previously. On the other, it is still the repository of images and emotions deriving from that phase, has assumed other roles in the meantime that are not yet superannuated, and, significantly, though the core elites may have jumped ship in a certain sense, in another are still deeply committed to it as their springboard of political influence in the world. Hence some agitate warmly for cosmopolitan variants of nationalism, for distinguishing between "patriotic" and "nationalist" and between working in favour of "national" and not "nationalist" interests (see the previous section), whilst other elite sections are doing their best to capitalize on programs that rest on maintaining or returning to the psychological and societal security of the "old order" of welfare and ethnic purity. Briefly, nationalism is responding to the global turn by reinventing itself, and can do so because different sections of the elites as well the national masses can see an interest in retaining a "project" which may no longer be in sync with the general thrust of the age, but which is still powerful enough to be invested with cultural and political meaning. This is true to such an extent that many of the processes which from one perspective can be analyzed as indications of the erosion and decline of nation-states and nationalisms, from another can be seen as attempts to – as Alan Milward has termed the phenomenon in an EU integration context – "rescue the nation-state" (Milward, 1992). The same kind of analysis could be expanded to cover different versions of liberal and cosmopolitan nationalism, programs for the regulation of multiethnic and

multicultural states, the division of sovereignty and decision-making capabilities between national and international institutions, the cooptation of transnational NGOs into national governance structures, the gradual acceptance of *ius soli* principles of citizenship and of multiple citizenships by many national governments.

There is no doubt that all this militates against the European blueprint of nation-state cohesion and rather exclusionary nationalism, that it represents a "package" which is still hard to swallow for European nation-states, and that it is put on the political (and cultural) agenda by the processes of globalism. It is important to recognize, however, not only that significant changes are occurring, but that they are occurring because nationalism like its political container, the nation-state, is not a fixed and immutable entity, but one that is malleable, multi-functional (Hedetoft, 1999) and historically and politically contingent. In the same way that its specific exclusionary form in the late 19th and early 20th century was determined by key political actors and institutions on the background of the imperialist struggle between European powers that they chose to get involved in (and hence to mobilize their publics for), and not by "capitalist economic interests" in any direct or even indirect form, in the same way this belligerent framework of interest and identity formulation is not the *indispensable* repository for *all* kinds of nationalism – though admittedly it has left a European legacy of interpretation and sentiment that nations and states have had to contend with throughout the 20th century. This is also, however, where the most serious reversal of the European national predicament must be located, both now and in a historical perspective reaching back to the end of WW II: its relation to war and war's significance for determining what national identity and virtues are or should be.

Where in the late 19th century war and inter-state conflict determined nationalism as exclusionary and hegemonic and the nation/state nexus as homogeneous, after WW II the (partly externally imposed) commitment of European states to the project of never again waging wars against each other (and in some nation-states, especially Germany, to not getting involved in war or warlike activities at all) has played a major role in redefining nationalism as pacific national identity. In other words, whereas "war" in the first phase became a proactive element in the positive and future-oriented definition of what nationalism was all about (eclipsing in the all-out cultivation of war and sacrifice by Nazism), in the second it has developed into a signifier and catalyst of what it is *not* and of what has to be overcome in order to attain a state of genuine "nationality" and to evince mature citizen qualities. Belliger-

ent nationalism is branded as the Negative Other of European history, something to be shunned and overcome as a sign of a superior, more advanced and more democratic civilization, in comparison, that is, with other parts of the world where such practices and national identity definitions are still in vogue.

The result of this process of political and popular redefinition is both complex and extraordinary: first, a stigmatization of nationalism (because nationalism is still widely interpreted as aggressive and belligerent *per se*); secondly a cultivation of moderate, but still inherently national qualities and loyalties which reside in people's capacity to distinguish their own moderate "national identity" and acceptable ways of celebrating it (in sports contexts not least) from the illegitimate and offensive "nationalism" of the Others (Billig, 1995); thirdly, the capacity to undertake a discrete distinction between the rejection of the national past as barbaric and the embrace of (much) the same past as the font of cherished national traditions, memories and legacies (see next section); fourthly, the willingness to (let) harness such sentiments to a variety of different political discourses and projects, some of which further global processes whilst attempting to constrain them (*e.g.* the EU), while others reintroduce exclusionary mental coordinates as instruments for the defense of the national home (*e.g.* anti-immigration platforms) (see section 5); and finally, the launch or backing of new kinds of warfare (Hardt and Negri's interventions of Empire), this time in the name of civilizational and democratic ideals, legitimated by the participation or support of supranational institutions like the UN, undertaken for the most part by the USA (and not Europe), and with the alleged objective of reinstating "peace" to the region in question (further on this in section 5).

This is a multifaceted package of European nationalism indeed – a reversal in some senses as compared with *phase I*, a transformation and dislocation in others, and a continuation in other ways still. It is both nostalgic and extremely functional, both "cosmopolitan" (the discourses of high politics) and "exclusionary" (the "low" politics of culture, migration and so forth), both typified by tendencies of nation/state decoupling (elites going transnational) and nation/state reaffirmation (elites warmly embracing their electorates and affirming their exceptionalist qualities). More than a situation of "nations without states(men)", this is a juncture characterized by still efficacious "nation-states without nationalism" – *i.e.* a situation where the practical cultivation of nationalism and national attachments is more or less officially decoupled from discourses and understandings of these phenomena *as* nationalist (let alone racist) – although a counter-tendency, reinstating such

labels to acceptability once again, seems to be under way after September 11, 2001, and the attendant focus on "national security" (section 5). Hence nationalist organizations which embrace such rhetoric nevertheless are, by definition, outside of the mainstream and for that reason are classified as "extreme" (whether right or left) – whether or not their actual policies diverge from mainstream policies or not.¹² The following section will take a closer look at the role and fate of national movement(s) and proponents thereof in the two phases.

4. NATIONAL MOVEMENTS: FROM PROACTIVE TO REACTIVE, AND FROM NATIONALISM TO ETHNICISM

Phase 1: It follows from what has been argued already that both the level and causes of societal (il)legitimacy and the mode and functionality through which national movements exist in the two phases are radically different. On one hand, this follows from the rather banal juxtaposition of a phase where nationalism, for the reasons given, is increasingly invested with positive values – and where movements set up in the name of the national cause are therefore seen to be both positive and progressive – and another phase where the nation-state by and large exists in the indicative mode, and where national movements are therefore either seen to be unnecessary or downright suspect, because they are associated with all the negative currency of outmoded nationalisms and racisms and are by and large perceived, by mainstream, consensual discourses, as regressive and nostalgic.¹³ Communities carrying the epithet "national" in their name and description of purpose, are *bona fide* as "associations", "organizations" and "institutions", but hardly as "movements" (see comments on "ethnic movements" under *phase 2* below). In a sense, "national movements" in a global age is a notion that can hardly avoid the suspicion of being a contradiction in terms: "movement" indicates something progressive and future-oriented, whereas "national(ist)" in the main-

¹² The case of the EU sanctions against Austria due to the participation of the Freedom Party in the new government provides an interesting example of how anti-immigrant political *discourses* and international perceptions thereof lead to punitive measures in the name of a defense of "humane values", while many of the countries backing those measures had already put in place anti-immigrant *policies* that were just as harsh or even harsher (see *e.g.* Jones, 2000).

¹³ Though this is not universally true for Central and Eastern Europe, nor for the multiple "diasporic" and "minority" communities living in all European states.

stream European context (things are different in other parts of the world) wears the mantle of conservatism and stasis.¹⁴ This is all valid, but does not reveal the complexities of the entire story. For that, I believe, we have to dig deeper and relate these questions of political functionalism more directly, and also more subtly, to the issues discussed in sections 2 and 3.

The combination of "nationalist" and "movement" around the turn of the 19th century signifies at the same time a social, a cultural and a political process of nation-state building in which the discrete "parts" (the different movements) legitimately represented – or at least aimed to represent – the ideal "whole". As a discursive figuration, they could be thought of as a metonymic structure, a *pars pro toto* fuelled by the nation-constructing teleology of conjoining the diverse imagined parts of the ideal wholeness of the homogeneous nation-state both horizontally (integrating different parts of societies into a national community of destiny and mission) and vertically (shaping bonds of identification and loyalty between people and state). Boy-scout movements, athletics movements, eugenics movements, literary and musical societies, linguistic and historical associations, imperial movements, educational movements, and even religious, moral and ethnographic societies – and here I am not even counting overtly political movements – were all inspired by the nationalist ethos and its overriding purpose of breathing "authenticity, originality and continuity" (Gutiérrez, 2001, 5) into the nation-state construct and, not least, getting this construct in shape for inter-national emulation with like-minded configurations in the surrounding world.

It is undoubtedly this laborious, proactive process of creating unity and unison between societal groups, between nation and state, between micro and macro developments, between the young and the old, and between history and the present that made Renan, in his famous Sorbonne lecture of 1882, talk of nationalism as a "daily plebiscite" – a question of will, choice and civic virtues that was predicated on an individual socialization process and on active participation by the individual citizen in the affairs of the nation-state. National movements in this phase fits this image, in the sense that they functioned as organizational levers for the instilment and maintenance both of "national consciousness" in a rather abstract sense (laying the foundation of what today we refer to as national identity, though a century ago the term "national character" was the preferred concept) and of practical civic loyalty to the national cause by each representing different dimensions of the "pack-

¹⁴. This question of legitimate, "official" national(ist) discourse must be kept separate from the strength and durability of banal, everyday manifestations of national belonging.

age" of national homogeneity. By means of these movements and the active intervention in them of what we could term the "national intelligentsia", nationalism became transformed from being mainly a political ideology to being the most important referent of collective cultural identification and political allegiance.

Whereas the distinction between "top-down" and "bottom-up" nationalisms, between "Western" and "Eastern" forms or between "civic" and "ethnic" is a useful classificatory matrix for earlier phases of the nation-building process in Europe, my contention is that around the turn of the 19th century this differentiation no longer matters, because now the process is turning into an international, symmetrical "project" proper, and a political one at that, where the state-induced instrumentalities of this modern, integrative as well as exclusivist project are of supreme significance for the purposes of the European states, which increasingly have come to see themselves through the eyes of the national Other and hence compete as both similar and very distinctive units (see earlier sections). The many different "movements" are on their way to coalescing into one grand national structure – and the success of the project explains why today we tend to speak as much of the nationalist movement as of nationalist movements in the plural. This is the phase, then, when nationalism is being completed, as a political project requiring wholesale backing of and allegiance to the state as one's own and very unique preserver of "identity". Clearly, democratic processes and movements played a part: material and particularistic interests translated into existential, universalist positions by means of claims-making processes in the public arena and the political recognition of the social groups involved. But precisely because more was involved – states were interested in a much more encompassing and enduring form of nation/state cohesion – such civic-political processes were not enough.

In other words, the "political", the "civic" dimension – Renan's "plebiscite" – was a necessary but far from sufficient requirement for the completion of the nationalist project. The political or politically inspired movements had to be complemented by the more culturalist, historicist and existentialist-*cum*-religious ones. The daily plebiscite needed to base itself on images of national continuity, past glories and a "collective memory" of ethnic/racial belonging. Memory and amnesia had to be – and were – shaped and functionalized for the nationalist mission, *inter alia* through the writing of national histories, the launch of national museums and nationalist-imperialist exhibitions, the creation of national fiction, the orchestration of public ceremonies and public

memorials that fitted the nationalist historical bill, and through a host of other policies and initiatives intended to harness the popular imaginary to the national cause.¹⁵ Further, as Gellner and many others have shown, elites were busy interpreting and representing special cultures, traditions and forms of interaction as national, and breaches as continuities (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). The past was being made functional for the present and the future, on a grander and more "hegemonic" scale than before, as "peasants" were being persuaded to view themselves and their life-chances as both active and still obedient members of "the French" nation-state (Weber, 1976; Dieckhoff, 2001) – or wherever they might have happened to be born.

Phase 2: In a pithy formulation, if the relationship between national movements and the legitimate nationalisms of nation-states in *phase 1* can be captured as a *pars pro toto* figure (the "real movement" as part representing the "ideal end-state" of a completed nationalism, a Utopia of coextensiveness between citizen and state), then the situation in *phase 2* is in many ways reversed. Today the real, "indicative" nation-state with its paraphernalia of banal nationalist manifestations and sentiments – *i.e.* the factual "*toto*" of the metonymic figure – is locked into a contest in which it is struggling *not* to be regarded as or relegated to the status of ideal "*pars*" by the combined forces of Europeanization and globalization – a Dystopia of eroded sovereignty, blurred cultural boundaries, multiple belongings (and citizenships) and a weakened historical rationale.¹⁶ State interests and national identities often find themselves at loggerheads within this contemporary configuration, in which – as argued earlier – the remaining popularity of national identity vies with the ambiguous legitimacy of political nationalism.

In turn this question relates to the issues of the contemporary rationale of nationalism, the role of memory and, particularly, the forms, normative status and agents of nationalist movements today. It would seem that today nationalism has lost most of the progressive, modernizing and state-buttrussing potential that it possessed a century ago – and for that reason also the ideological and discursive optimism of pre-WW I outreach imperialism. To the

¹⁵ See *e.g.* Dieckhoff & Gutiérrez (2001) for different contributions on these issues, and *e.g.* Mackenzie (1984), for an in-depth analysis of how these processes were orchestrated in Britain.

¹⁶ An opaque reflection of this changing relationship can be found in International Relations Theory, in the difference between classical Realism and Neo-Realism: in the former the nation-state is the primary and central "unit" which determines the nature of the "system", in the latter the relation is reversed: now the "system" subsumes and defines the power and competences of its discrete parts, the "units".

extent that it enjoys quite some popularity and widespread attention (also among political and intellectual elites) nevertheless – as a kind of "New nationalism" in either a moderate (*cf.* "constitutional patriotism") or a "new racist" variant – this phenomenon should be understood in *reactive* and *defensive* terms. Memory and tradition are invoked to buttress or harness affective attachments and to justify that immigrant newcomers (other *ethnies*) do not belong in our culture; national identity and sovereignty in the classical mode are called on by a motley array of anti-globalists, national nostalgics and cultural gloom-and-doomers to ward off the imagined apocalypse of tomorrow; and new formulations ("cosmopolitan" or "liberal" nationalism) are invented in order to salvage the "civic" and non-belligerent dimensions of nationalism, to make it fit into the new global order of universal human rights and values, and most significantly to rid it of its aggressive connotations.

Despite the great variety of these nationalist responses, they are linked to each other by three common denominators: they are reactive rather than proactive; they have little ideological content and future-oriented vision (*i.e.* they have been robbed of both their rationale and their positive normative status); and they do not constitute nationalist movements in any sense that is comparable to the situation a century earlier. In these senses, "the national" has cut itself off from the temporal linearity and progressive rationale of modernity – has possibly reached the "end of (its) history" and has entered what could be termed a musealized stage, where national cultures and identities – in fixed, stylized and sentimental formats – are suitable for touristic displays of folklore and other symbolic demonstrations of particularism and uniqueness, but not as the ideological wellspring and core rationale of state action. A number of caveats are needed, however, to get fully to grips with the complexities of this situation.

First, it could be argued that movements to defend or preserve national cultures or languages, to limit immigration (because it is seen as a menace to national identities), or to oppose the European integration process do in fact constitute nationalist movements and do enjoy a lot of popular and some intellectual support as well (though both differ according to the country reviewed). This is true, but they are movements "in the reverse", intent on preserving what is allegedly being lost, discursively on the defensive, and more often than not both marginalized from mainstream politics and public opinion. (Apart from this, most of these movements or parties feel compelled to legitimate their existence by developing alternative visions of international commitment and often participate actively in transnational networks.)

Secondly, it could be contended that intellectual and political elites championing versions of liberal nationalism (like Third Way proponents or Habermas-inspired models for non-ethnic "nationalism" on a European scale), do in fact represent a future-oriented and ideological version of nationalism. However, whereas it is true that such programmatic formulations contain both visions for the future (however Utopian or unreal they might seem) and attempts to salvage nationalism, these two components are separate and intrinsically decoupled from each other. In other words they are not "nationalist programs", *i.e.* political strategies premised and dependent on their explicit nationalist content. On closer inspection, there exist in fact different kinds of *caesura* between the future orientation of the political substance and the defensive cultural salvage dimension of the nationalist formulations – conspicuous, for instance, in various ideas for the preservation of national identities in the EU, most of which are predicated on a *separation* between "culture" and "politics". And as regards third-way programs, their nationalist dimension basically boils down to a concern for the destabilizing effects of globalization for the societal cohesion and the loyalty of peoples toward their political leadership, and hence, on closer inspection, comprises little more than rather vacuous appeals to civil society and individual citizens to demonstrate more maturity.

Thirdly, it could be rightly argued that there are a number of extant preserves of nationalism and nationalist manifestations – like sports, cultural contests, civic heroisms, museum exhibitions dealing with national histories etc. This is undoubtedly a valid point, but it should be noticed that these domains of "legitimate nationalism" are relatively few, that they must primarily be analyzed as compensatory and dislocated valves for the popular articulation of nationalism, based on the popularity that national identity still widely enjoys, and most importantly that they do not provide the basis for the creation of nationalist *movements* (with the exception of the cases where *e.g.* football supporter organizations are linked up with neo-nationalist and neo-fascist politics – in which case they are covered by the first point above).

Fourthly – and most importantly – a central counter-argument might be that organizations working for the recognition of national or ethnic or regional minorities in Europe are numerous, that they look to the future, often enjoy both legitimacy and ideological backing, and that they do constitute nationalist movements in a specific sense. In cases such as Scottish and Catalan "regional" nationalisms (Dickinson & Lynch, 2000; Cultiaux, 2001), this argument makes a valid point, though in both these and a few other cases the

political goal of national separatism is severely mitigated both by ambitions for federal set-ups within the multi-ethnic states in question and by strategic links with the EU, where it often pays off to retain regional status. Most often the above-mentioned separation between cultural nationalism and political attachments is significant in these cases too. The difference is that "indigenous culture" is often strategically harnessed to and instrumentalized for mainstream political objectives (nationally as well as internationally). For the same reasons, discourses of nationalism are here legitimate, though they need to be contained and occasionally be given a cultural rather than political interpretation in order not to "get out of hand". This is not a concern in cases such as Basque separatism or Northern Irish republicanism, which take the "old" nation-state paradigm so seriously that an explosive combination of nationalism, territorialism, religion and armed struggle is engendered, in almost a present-day travesty of the forms and substances which "real" nationalism is supposed to possess.

In the case of migrant organizations based on ethnicity and working for multicultural states, the situation is different, in the sense that, although they are no doubt social and political *movements* with a forward-looking agenda, they are "ethnic" rather than "national", in other words represent, present themselves as, and gain their legitimacy through the very fact that they are *not* mainstream political initiatives and do not base their claims-making efforts on an ambition of nation-state homogeneity or a model of cultural assimilation as a basis for their identity construction. Though they act within the political confines of the nation-state and aim at integrating into and participating as citizen organizations in national societies, they simultaneously organize in transnational or diasporic networks and often around multiple forms of belonging and identity (Christiansen & Hedetoft, 2004; Hedetoft & Hjort, 2002; Kymlicka, 2001).

This is not the place to enter into a prolonged discussion of these "postmodern" forms of identity formation and socio-cultural movements, except to argue that their *quasi*-legitimacy and forward-looking potential springs from the fact that in terms of both self-understanding and societal value ascription they are separate from nationalist movements in *phase 1*. The significant point is that these movements both match the "right to difference" recognized by the dominant paradigm of cultural relativism, and can be perceived as striving for something akin to, but still different from the "pacific" form of European national identity that has developed after WW II. However, as just indicated, these movements and ambitions are only *quasi*-legitimate, since

they also provide an important source of nationalist animosity for proponents of New Nationalist/New Racist movements (*cf.* the argument under *firstly* above).

This brings me to the last section, which will be concerned with different Self/Other configurations in the two phases.

5. ELITE DISCOURSE AND MASS PERCEPTION OF "THE OTHER"

Phase I: The hardening and political "securitization" of nationalism that took place in Europe around 1900 had a number of implications for the construction of "Self" *versus* "Other" in that period. The consensual legitimacy of nationalism was promoted by the imperial interests and intensified mutual grievances of European states – in the form of struggles for territory and economic and political resources. Unlike previous stages of the nation-building process in Europe, the politicization and burgeoning militarization of nationalism in this phase build on and strengthen a paradigmatic nationalism of absolute and rigidified lines of separation between "us" and "them".¹⁷ The cultural entrepreneurs of nationalism were being supplanted by an intimate linkage between politicizing ideologues and ideological politicians (in some cases they are the same persons) taking advantage of the potentialities that nationalism offered them, supported by more or less sophisticated "theories" of scientific racism, theories which were frequently turned into ideological and political practice in the shape of various "eugenics" movements in practically speaking all the western European countries and North America as well.¹⁸

The significant point to push home is less that in this era we witness a powerful combination of nationalism and racism, and more that the attendant cultural-ideological matrix of Self-adulation and absolutist images of Others, despite (or because) the objections and resistance of Socialism in many different guises, were legitimate, state-approved, often state-directed, "scientific"

¹⁷ Which were largely typified by educated elites arguing for and constructing the cultural, linguistic and ethnological *foundations* for national uniqueness and by a certain intermingling of cosmopolitan openness and national particularism.

¹⁸ By this I understand hierarchically ordered categorizations of homo sapiens into different "races", all characterized by a close link between "genotype" and "phenotype".

cally" ordered, and linked with the fierce inter-state competition and belligerent war climate existing among European states. Thus, racially underpinned state-nationalism (the power of which was apparent both in the French Dreyfus Affair, in the British war against the Boers and other colonial incalcitrants, and in Bismarck's anti-socialist legislation) and its attendant exclusivist images of Others came to constitute the moral order of society, a *Zeitgeist* engineered by national elites for the masses – who became nationalized in the process.

It is tempting to characterize this process as the epitome of European nationalism, due to the conflation of nation, race, state, politics, military ambitions, territoriality etc. within an overarching structure of rigid nation/state delimitations and consensual moral legitimacy. In a sense, and with the benefits of historical hindsight, this is even partly true – at least this is the phase in which European nationalism in many ways came closest to realizing (or fought each other to realize) the coextensiveness of politics, culture and territory which we refer to as nationalism.

On the other hand, it is a truth which needs to be seriously tempered by at least two reflections. First, the cultural, historical and "mental" conditions for the construction of such absolute nationalisms were born and bred of colonialism (slavery, images of racial superiority and inferiority, *quasi*-feudal power autocracy, civilizing missions, capitalizing on mentalities of "subjects" rather than "citizens", etc.) rather than nationalism. In fact, the political ambitions providing the teleological core of the process transforming a "cosmopolitan" Europe into a "national" one had the trademark of territorial colonialism writ large, to such an extent that a more mature nationalist rationale later in the 20th century came to view both the ambitions and their instruments as misguided (the consequence, of course, was decolonization). And secondly, what has often been described as inter-state rivalry brought about by nationalist sentiments in an era of more or less embryonic popular rule (depending on the country in question), should more adequately be conceived as a *statist* process, with state actors playing the crucial proactive part, defining the interests to be pursued, while the national masses were being instrumentalized for objectives that were politically identified. In other words, in this unholy alliance of a colonial perceptual matrix and nation-building ambitions, nations and nationalisms played the role of *condition* and *justification*, but not of *cause* of the inter-state competition leading to WW I.

As regards immigration and immigrants as a source and butt of hostile stereotypes, this is admittedly the phase in which such cultural constructions saw the light of day (particularly in the shape of anti-Jewish sentiments – see *e.g.* White, 1899), but it must be noted that their rationale and societal status were significantly different from today. Since the accepted climate of opinion and legitimate political strategies favoured an expansionist state-nationalism and rather hostile stereotypes of aliens, and since the political and ideological thrust was "outward" rather than "inward", *separate* anti-immigrant movements were rare. The race/migrant issue conflated with wider elite agitation and platforms regarding "foreigners", who were mainly to be found outside of "our" borders. However, *e.g.* in the shape of debates related to "miscegenation", the issue *was* beginning to be looked on as a cause for national-racial concern, mainly in terms of the widely debated "demoralization" and "degeneration" of the "imperial race" in Britain (and elsewhere as well), which on the one hand constituted the foundation for diverse attempts to breathe renewed life into the national spirit in order to reinforce the nation's resolve and martial virtues, and on the other fed into the mind-set of *fin-de-siècle* cultural pessimism which complemented the officially promoted optimism of the national cause in paradoxical ways (Cramb, 1900; Hedetoft, 1990; Mangan & Walvin, 1987). Nevertheless, even these debates were set in a much larger context than that provided by the immigrant issues themselves, sparked off by colonial uprisings, economic worries, and the inter-European rivalry itself. Succinctly put: issues and questions related to "immigration" were subordinate to and contingent on those related to "war" (Hedetoft, 1995, 1-59, 191-222) – here understood as a symbolic referent of exclusivist foreign-policy ideology, cultural border demarcations, and nation/state unity.

Phase 2: In contrast, the late 20th century, particularly following the "end of communism", is the age and spirit of "intercultural collaboration" (rather than rivalry) and "ethnicity" (rather than "race") – an age characterized by cultural relativism and the discursive softening of enemy imagery in Europe. These kinds of discourses, perceptions and (to some extent) practices are intimately bound up with the European integration project and its necessary abandonment of nationalist exclusivism as regards political and cultural interaction. It provides both the conditions and the justification for the widely accepted, Kantian-inspired tenet that war between democracies is now impossible and that "our civilization" has achieved a state of "perpetual peace". The problem persists, however, both in the shape of the "real" Other (alien cultures, ethnicities and civilizations), but also in the dilution of national sovereignty and territorial demarcations which follows from the official pacifism of the age,

from globalization, and from European integration as well. The two threat scenarios ("high-political" clashes of civilizations and anxieties about what global and European developments might do to established national identities) coalesce in the creation of the "enemy within", represented in the popular imaginary and media-disseminated stereotypes by innate and ineradicable features of "third world" migrants and refugees. The agents and vehicles of this nationalist backlash are anti-immigrant movements: "popular" rather than "elite" constructions, critical of "too liberal" state practices (and of state actors who either by design or by default are betraying the nationalist cause and the nation-state nexus through their transnational contacts) and advocating a return to a *status quo ante*. The immediate consequence is a polarization between a liberally minded, outward-oriented and muted nationalist frame of reference (attached to globality and European cooperation, and manifested in discourses of multiculturalism and ethnic diversity), and a discourse of national egoism and cultural preservation, feeding directly off a resistance to such policies and perceptions.

Comparing this phase with *phase 1*, it is striking that issues and "problems" related to immigration cut themselves loose from those concerned with "war", or possibly better formulated: the immigration arena turns into a dislocated war arena as regards rhetoric and symbolic currency. Dislocated from the core elites as well as from legitimate discourse, but holding significant sway over the popular imaginary. The immigrant/refugee Other becomes a repository of negative images, a kind of symbolic incarnation of all the ills coming to "us" from *the outside*, whilst being manifestly present in significant numbers *among us*. In this way, the hostile imagery of *phase 1* – at least in terms of its formal properties – lives on at a societal level partly dissociated from official politics and legitimate national discourse and serving other functions and interests. Whereas in *phase 1*, the nationalizing elites undertook a homogenizing project for the masses in order, first, to integrate the "ethnic" minorities *within* the self-defined national territory into the nation-state compact, and, secondly, to contain "globalism" and to prevail in the embryonic international order, today this kind of nationalism is chiefly represented "from below" and sees the global threat as coming from both from above (their traditional political representatives) and from without (the immigrant ethnic minorities and for some the European Union). One of the consequences is a discernible disillusionment about "normal" politics and growing disaffection with both political actors and processes.

On the other hand, although there is a difference, there is no clear-cut dichotomy between the "cultural relativism" of the cosmopolitan elites and the "national exclusivism" of the "new-old" nationalists. There are mainly three reasons for this, one conceptual, the second political (power-related), and the third and most important historical.

The first (conceptual) reason has to do with the relationship between essentialism on the one hand and racism and cultural relativism (or diversity), respectively, on the other. It has been rightly argued that although the link between essentialism and racism is explicit and clear-cut, this does not mean that cultural relativism is devoid of essentialist content. "Ethnicity" and "culture" are more modern notions and the assumption of a hierarchy of cultures has gone, but nevertheless "culture/ethnicity" stands in a direct line of descent from notions of "race" and are, at least in important variants, no less essentialist (Blum, 2001; Wodak & Reisigl, 2000). Not just notions of cultural diversity and multiethnic societies, but also the tenets underlying the international order of nation-states, all build on the "objective", *i.e.* permanent, inalienable and inherent, properties of the cultural units involved and their right to be socially respected and politically recognized (Parekh, 2000). In the context of the present argument, "race" is a notion and a discourse deriving from the "self-other" grid of the national-imperialist phase (it carries the hallmarks of classical colonialism), whereas "ethnicity" or "culture" are imbricated with the later and more enlightened phase of national modernity. At the same time, more "orthodox" racism persists, both in institutional practices and popular perception, under the protective umbrella of a legitimate discourse of cultural relativism, *i.e.* a specific form of more or less reluctant recognition of the Other, which sets this form of essentialism apart from the racism of *phase 1*.

The political reason relates to the usefulness of "self-other" nationalism for the elites and their many different ways of capitalizing on it. Maintaining, sometimes even fuelling, hostile images of immigrants or asylum-seekers among the ethno-national majority populations is an indispensable and rather gratuitous instrument in the arsenal of discursive remedies at the disposal of political actors looking for ways and means to counteract political disenchantment or at least siphon it in directions less harmful to themselves. In spite of the inroads made by transnational processes on the "identity bind" between states and peoples and in spite of the increasingly global orientation and networking of political elites, they still need to be concerned about their respective national arenas as the *sine qua non* of their political mandate and

their admission ticket to global influence. Hence they do their best to try to adapt popular attitudes to foreigners to their own ends by being tough on immigration, but also to project an image to the outside world of themselves and their countries as guarantors of humane values and civilized behaviour. The consequent balancing act between different discourses, between discourses and policies, and between policies and practices is not always successful, but the fact that it is being enacted in all European countries is evidence of vested, structurally embedded political interests in capitalizing on popular fears of immigration while simultaneously promoting or at least taking advantage of those same global processes (see the analysis of different national parliamentary debates over immigration policies in Wodak & van Dijk, 2000). Hence, though there may be differences between mainstream politics and "right-wing", anti-immigrant parties as regards principles, values and "ideology", there is also considerable common ground as regards immigration issues and questions of national-cultural particularism and belonging in that respect. While at some point this coalescence may have been due to tactical considerations among mainstream parties – trying to hold on to angry, volatile voters by projecting themselves as hardliners too – recently there seems to be a more profound change of values and attitudes underway, a notable shift of "perceptual paradigm". This has to do with the third reason.

The last half-decade or so has seen an emerging challenge to the paradigm of cultural relativism and a revival of a grander narrative in the form of legitimate discourses of civilizational clashes and the securitization of population movements, *e.g.* in the form of projections of terrorism and the threat that it constitutes to "universal, democratic values". Of course such discourses in and of themselves – *e.g.* Barber (1995), Huntington (1996), Juergensmeyer (2001), etc. – are embedded in outward-oriented, global (and very American) perspectives, interests and values, and thus align themselves with cosmopolitanism rather than introspective nationalism. It should not be overlooked, however, that the practical political consequences of this reinstatement of a (new) conflation between a spirit of militant alertness ("war"), migration and Othering are a securitization and legitimation of not only the migration area (and attendant stereotypes) as such, but of this area at the level of *national* politics and border controls. This trend was not created by but certainly received a boost from the events of September 11, 2001, to such an extent that it is currently acceptable and above-board not just to curtail traditional civic liberties in the "security interests of state", but also to combine – discursively as well as in political practice – the former "micro-politics" of immigration controls with the "macro-politics" of world affairs.

What seems to be happening is a double process of re-legitimation of hostile stereotypes and national heterotypes: on the one hand, the immigration domain is moving from a position of "dislocation" (in the sense laid out above) to one of centrality (hence it was able to take center stage in the recent parliamentary elections in Denmark and is being tabled as central in the upcoming German elections too); and on the other it is, as in *phase I* (but within a different logic), being conflated with and subsumed under "larger" issues of state, war and security – or to put it differently, "immigration" is being reappropriated by the political imaginary of state actors. This time around, however, this *nation-state* revival within a context of militant emergency is happening in the name of human rights and democratic values worldwide and spearheaded by self-styled *cosmopolitans*.

However, since charity begins at home, it is the home turf of nation-states that is perceived to be most seriously under attack both from within and without. The result in cultural terms is a new national morality of cynicism, a self-righteous spirit of ruthlessness-in-a-good-cause, from the Atlantic to the Adriatic (to mimic a famous Churchillian formulation of external danger). It would seem that somehow *phase I* has come back with a vengeance – the spirit of absolute values is with us again, pejorative images of the Other are legitimate, masses and elites are pulling together (though this is a contradictory and possibly very unstable unity), and even explicit biological racism is being revived.

In the short term, nations and nationalisms are the benefactors of this apparent demise of cultural relativism and increased scepticism against multicultural policy solutions (also in countries like Sweden and Holland, previously renowned for their adherence to and implementation of multicultural policy solutions). However, it is far from certain that this might not eventually prove to be a transitional stage in a long-term process of diminishing or at least refunctionalizing the role of European nation-states in and for a more global order of the future. If so, it would not be without some historical irony: The martialism of *phase I* eventually brought about a weakening of nationalism in Europe; this time it might well be the midwife of a thoroughgoing global order dominated by the American hegemon.

6. A CONCLUSION

My two introductory questions were, to put it briefly, (1) if what we are seeing now is little more than a repeat performance of the national/global nexus some one hundred years ago, and (2) how mass-elite interactions today shape up in comparison with the late 19th century, *e.g.* in the perspective of nationalist movements and their forms, functions and legitimacy in the two phases.

As regards the first issue, the analysis has indicated that the interface between nationalism and globality in the two phases is distinctive and cannot be conceived as either coterminous or as different manifestations of the same fundamental pattern. In a certain sense the two processes are reversals of each other: late 19th-century developments mark a process in which a rather borderless (and partially uncharted and therefore "conquerable") transnational world is being appropriated and reshaped by nation-states and political nationalisms, and where the politicization and securitization of national interests and identities weld nations and states, masses and elites into unified wholes through discourses and practices of war, exclusivism and Self-adulation. *Phase I* represents a peculiar and unique mix of colonial/imperial interests and national forms – impacting notions and ideals (positive as well as negative) of national identity throughout the 20th century in profound ways.

In an interesting sense this process has been reversed in the late 20th century. The specific forms of transnational interaction which were born and bred of nation-states and their extraneous interests have produced a series of "global" processes – a new borderless world of sorts – which are currently challenging the nation-states themselves and producing new and historically unique mixes of the National and the Global. The kind of globality lying in wait for us is clearly not just a reproduction of 19th-century empires. First, it springs from nation-states and national interests and needs to assimilate and reshape them; and second, it is much more ubiquitous, powerful and truly global than the rather limited and truncated forms which 19th-century imperialism assumed. In spite of apparent similarities (not least the return of cultural diversity and multicultural politics – and the current reactions against this complex in the name of security against outside dangers), contemporary processes must be regarded as *sui generis*. This does not mean, however, that they are dissociated from the political and cultural events round the turn of the 19th century. What this paper has tried to argue is in fact quite different:

i.e. that *phase 1* created a nationalist legacy (a historically *specific* vision of nationalism and national identity) which has set a *general* standard for what nationalism *is* and hence what should be embraced or rejected – a mental and normative paradigm which still co-determines the trajectory of cultural and international relations in a myriad uneven and asymmetrical ways (of which only some have been examined in this article). In other words, rather than assuming that *phase 2* is a replica or a continuation of *phase 1*, there is a significant element of *historical interpretation* tying them together.

It is the dimension of unevenness and asymmetry which sets mass/elite interactions today apart from the late 19th-century nexus. Whereas the nationalization of the masses was a rather unidirectional homogenizing process – the "nations" being nationally integrated and mobilized in a linear process of subsumption under the imperial interests of states – the bind today is multi-directional, liminal and uneven (both within countries and in cross-national comparison). Sometimes some elite sections pursue state interests through the mobilization of popular sentiment (particularly in matters of immigration), but more often this is not a legitimate or a practical way of conducting politics. Interest articulation and identity formation only partially overlap. This also applies to the arena of ethnic identity politics. For national citizens with a longing for the past (and they can be found all across the political spectrum and at all levels of society) – *i.e.* those who still adhere to an image of old-style national politics – the global imposition on the nation/state nexus constitutes an intolerable affront which must be opposed. The nation-state should be reinvigorated, sovereignty reasserted, homogeneity restored. Globalization should either be reversed or firmly subordinated to national interests and identities. However, the more nostalgic nationalists attempt to return to the safety of the national nest (often in its welfare-state permutations), the more their dramatic discourses reveal themselves as reactive and their political nationalism as qualitatively different from the reality underlying the ideal they conjure up. In brief: whereas European nationalism round the turn of the 19th century was a *weapon* in the struggle over global resources, today it has largely turned into a *bulwark* against the encroachments of globality on the framework investing it with symbolic meaning: the nation-state. In this sense it has become increasingly self-referential, has developed into its own justification, and is no longer able to fulfill progressive historical functions.

ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
UN	United Nations

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Verschillende fasen, een verschillende logica: nationalisme en mondialisering aan twee eeuwwisselingen

ULF HEDETOFT

SAMENVATTING

Het artikel onderzoekt de aard van nationale identiteit en nationale bewegingen in Europa. Het focust op massa/elite configuraties in de tijd van het natievormingsproces (19e en een deel van de 20ste eeuw – *fase 1*) enerzijds en in het huidige globale tijdperk (*fase 2*) anderzijds. Het belangrijkste referentiekader zijn de twee eeuwwisselingen: van de 19^e naar de 20ste en van de 20ste naar de 21ste. Hoewel de twee fasen verschillende substadia bevatten (in uiteenlopende nationale configuraties), focust deze paper dus op de relatie tussen het nationalisme en de mondialiseringsprocessen in respectievelijk de late 19e en de late 20ste eeuw.

Het doel hiervan is enerzijds een licht te werpen op twee fasen in de geschiedenis van het nationalisme, waarin de interactie tussen "het nationale" en "het globale" cruciaal is. Op deze manier kan aangetoond worden dat mondialisering niets nieuw is (wat sommigen tegenspreken) en dat we de meeste aspecten ervan reeds ontmoet hebben. Anderzijds is het de bedoeling enkele gelijkenissen en verschillen aan te duiden in de massa/elite verhouding (en de link met nationale bewegingen) in een tijd waarin de moderne natiestaat opkomt en in een tijd waarin deze (zoals sommigen zeggen) een terugval maakt.

Samengevat beoogt het artikel:

- de normatieve status van nationale bewegingen en het nationale discours te analyseren;
- de onderliggende politieke of ideologische grondgedachten en de belangrijkste voorvechters van het nationalisme te identificeren (onderscheid: "van keuterboeren naar Fransmannen" *versus* "de revolutie van de elites") en in deze context de materiële *versus* de niet-materiële aspecten van nationale bewegingen te bediscussiëren (onderscheid: functionele *versus* existentiële motieven om ergens bij te horen);

- de symbolische grondgedachten van nationale bewegingen in *fase 1* te contrasteren met de huidige basisconcepten, in de context van de verschillende rol van geheugen en missie in de twee fasen;
- de verschillende discoursen en doelen van racisme, anti-immigratiebewegingen en tijdsbepaalde constructies van de Anderen te vergelijken, met respect voor de belangen, grieven en interacties tussen het nationaal egoïsme en de internationale samenwerking. In deze context de impact van oorlog en oorlogsretoriek – hun aanwezigheid of afwezigheid, legitimiteit of illegitimiteit, oude of nieuwe discursieve vorm – te bespreken.

Het artikel heeft tot doel een theorie te ontwikkelen, maar illustreert alles met casussen en illustratief materiaal vanuit verschillende nationale Europese contexten.

Le nationalisme et la mondialisation aux changements de siècles: dissemblance des phases et de la logique

ULF HEDETOFT

RÉSUMÉ

L'article étudie la nature de l'identité nationale et des mouvements nationaux en Europe. Il s'intéresse au rapport de la masse et de l'élite, d'une part, lors du processus de formation de la nation – le 19^e siècle et une partie du 20^e (*phase 1*) et, d'autre part, dans la période globale actuelle (*phase 2*). Le cadre de référence principal se situe aux tournants du 19^e et du 20^e siècle. Bien que les deux phases comportent des sous-étapes propres aux différentes configurations nationales, cette analyse cible la relation entre les processus du nationalisme et de la mondialisation, respectivement à la fin du 19^e siècle et du 20^e.

Il s'agit, tout d'abord, de mettre en lumière deux périodes de l'histoire du nationalisme, au cours desquelles l'interaction entre le "national" et le "global" s'avère cruciale. Cela permet de démontrer que, contrairement à ce que certains prétendent, la mondialisation n'est pas un fait nouveau. Nous avons,

en effet, déjà été confrontés à la plupart des aspects de ce phénomène. Ensuite, les ressemblances et les différences dans les rapports établis entre la masse et l'élite sont évoquées aux périodes, à la fois, d'émergence et – comme l'affirment d'aucuns – de déclin de la nation moderne.

En résumé, l'article vise à :

- analyser le statut normatif des mouvements nationaux et du discours national;
- identifier les idées de base politiques et idéologiques sous-jacentes ainsi que les premiers défenseurs du nationalisme (distinction: "des petits fermiers aux fransquillons" face à "la révolte des élites"; dans ce contexte, comparer les éléments matériels aux données non matérielles des mouvements nationaux, en distinguant les motivations d'appartenance fonctionnelle et existentielle);
- opposer les idées symboliques de fond des mouvements nationaux de la *phase 1* aux concepts actuels, dans le contexte des rôles différents joués par la mémoire et la mission dont leurs membres se sentent investis, dans les deux phases;
- comparer les discours et les intentions du racisme et des mouvements anti-immigration à la perception, dans le temps, de l'Autre avec le respect des intérêts, des griefs et de l'interaction entre l'égoïsme national et la collaboration internationale; traiter dans ces circonstances l'impact de la guerre et de la rhétorique guerrière (sont-elles présentes ou non? sont-elles légitimes ou non? la forme du discours, est-elle ancienne ou nouvelle).

Des cas empruntés aux différentes nations européennes illustrent la théorie développée dans l'article.