

Occupation authorities as well as from German industrialists. In addition, de Launoit had to take account of the «supervision» of his actions by the clandestine press as well as receiving requests for financial, material or diplomatic assistance from clandestine Belgian groups or from victims of the Occupation. Paul de Launoit thus found himself between two potential reefs and he had to navigate with considerable skill in order to pilot his group without disaster through the perils of the war while ensuring that it remained as intact as possible.

In consequence, Paul de Launoit opted in this domain to follow the policy on industrial production laid down by Galopin and approved the principles developed by Galopin to justify this active industrial policy: a «policy of the lesser evil» which, in order to prevent worse alternatives, authorised even the production of semi-military goods for the German authorities. Nevertheless, though basing himself on the same fundamental principles as Galopin, de Launoit occasionally implemented this policy differently when he believed that he was thereby better serving the interests of his group, of his employees or of himself or because in these specific instances he could not accept the attitude adopted by Galopin. In this way, de Launoit left open the opportunity to emerge as a «good patriot».

It is undeniable that de Launoit maintained relations with the German authorities which in retrospect can appear suspect. The evidence drawn from the dossier compiled during the post-war investigation of his actions relating to the behaviour of de Launoit and the context of the contracts and negotiations in question do, however, lead one to nuance considerably these suspicions and to refute entirely the opinions on this subject advanced by Gillingham.

Thierry GROSBOIS, *Het ontstaan van de Benelux (1941-1942)*.

De organisatie van het naoorlogse Europa in functie van regionale akkoorden vindt zijn oorsprong in de Benelux, eerste verwezenlijking van die aard. De onderhandelingen tussen de drie partners gingen eerst over een monetair akkoord, dat op 21 oktober 1943 werd ondertekend en uitstekend werd onthaald door de pers en de officiële geallieerde middens. Het meer complexe ontwerp van doeanee-unie mondde op 5 september 1944 uit in een voorlopige overeenkomst. Deze droeg de stempel van het vorige experiment van de Belgisch Luxemburgische Economische Unie. Bij de Bevrijding doken er problemen op die de toepassing van de overeenkomst in het gedrang brachten: Het Noorden van Nederland bleef langer dan verwacht bezet en het Ardennenoffensief veroorzaakte enorme schade in het Groot-Hertogdom en Belgisch Luxemburg. Na de oorlog werd er opnieuw onderhandeld en werd het gemeenschappelijk doeanetarief op 1 januari 1948 uiteindelijk van kracht.

Dit artikel toont aan dat, in tegenstelling met een tot nu toe gangbaar idee, het eerste doel van de oprichting van de Benelux niet de verwe-

zenlijking van een economische integratie van de drie ondertekenende landen was. Deze maakten vooral deel uit van de Benelux-unie met het doel een soort van drukkingsgroep van kleine Westeuropese naties te vormen, waardoor ze beter hun standpunt zouden kunnen laten gelden bij de grote mogendheden in internationale onderhandelingen.

In dat opzicht was de Benelux een succes, vermits ze een van de pijlers van de Europese konstruktie was.

Thierry GROSBOIS, *The Birth of Benelux (1941-1944)*.

The re-organisation of post-war Europe on the basis of regional accords had its origins in the establishment of Benelux, the first such achievement of this kind. The negotiations between the three partners resulted first in a monetary agreement which was signed on 21 October 1943 and was highly favourably received by the press and by the Allied authorities. The more complex problem of a customs union resulted in the signing on 5 September 1944 of a temporary convention. This was strongly influenced by the prior experience of the U.E.B.L. At the Liberation, unexpected problems rendered the application of this convention difficult: the north of the Netherlands remained occupied longer than had been anticipated and the offensive in the Ardennes resulted in significant destruction in the Grand-Duchy and the Belgian Luxembourg. The convention was renegotiated after the war and the common customs tariff finally came into operation on 1 January 1948.

This article demonstrates that, contrary to what has been commonly believed until now, the initial purpose of the creation of Benelux was not to bring about an economic integration of the three signatory countries. They adhered to the Benelux union above all with the aim of creating a sort of pressure group of small countries of western Europe which would enable them to make their point of view felt in international negotiations with the great powers.

In this respect, Benelux was a success since it formed one of the foundations of the reconstruction of Europe.

Patrick NEFORS, *L'exigence de toluol par l'occupant : La partie «grise» de la doctrine Galopin (septembre 1940-janvier 1942)*.

Début septembre 1941, l'occupant allemand exigea que l'industrie belge pousse au maximum sa production de toluol, un produit de base pour la synthèse d'explosifs comme le trinitrotoluène (TNT). En même temps, il exigea tous les stocks. Cette double exigence suscita un grand trouble et une grande inquiétude chez les producteurs. En effet, il s'agissait là de la livraison d'un produit qui pouvait être considéré comme munition.

Au travers de cet examen du problème du toluol, l'auteur dégage les principes sur lesquels se fondait la politique belge de production et analyse le processus décisionnel dans la mise en oeuvre de ces principes. Il étudie la manière dont fut interprétée, dans la question du toluol, la doctrine Galopin sur la reprise de l'activité industrielle, plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne l'interdiction de la production d'armes et de munitions, l'extension de la capacité de production et le problème des compensations.

Patrick NEFORS, *The Demand for Toluol by the German Occupation Authorities: The «Grey» Area of the Galopin Doctrine (September 1940-January 1942)*.

At the beginning of September 1941, the German authorities demanded that Belgian industry raise to its maximum level its production of toluol, a base material for the production of explosives such as trinitrotoluene (TNT). At the same time, it demanded that all stocks of toluol be handed over to them. This dual order gave rise to much concern and apprehension among the Belgian producers of toluol. In effect, it amounted to the delivery of a product which could be considered to be a munition.

Through an examination of the issues raised by this problem of toluol, the author draws out the principles on which Belgian policy towards wartime industrial production was based and analyses the decision-making process in the implementation of these principles. The author studies the way in which, regarding the problem of toluol, the Galopin doctrine on the resumption of industrial activity was implemented, and more particularly how it related to the ban on the production of arms and munitions, the expansion in the capacity of production and the problem of compensation.

Etienne VERHOEYEN, *De inlichtingendienst «Marc» (1942-1944). Tweede deel*.

In het eerste deel van zijn studie over een van de belangrijkste inlichtingendiensten in bezet België, beschreef Etienne Verhoeyen het ontstaan van de Dienst onder de naam *Luc*, zijn overname door Max Londot in oktober 1942, zijn structuur, zijn werking en de veranderingen die hij onderging ingevolge arrestaties en tussenkomsten van *Maud* (Belgische Staatsveiligheid te Londen en M.I.6, beter gekend als de *Secret Intelligence Service*). In het eerste deel schetste Verhoeyen eveneens een socio-professioneel profiel van de drie groepen agenten. In het tweede deel, onderzocht hij de aard van de gevraagde en ingewonnen inlichtingen en de manier waarop ze aan Londen werden overgemaakt. Hij belicht eveneens de doelstellingen van de intense radiotelegrafische trafiek tussen Londen en de Dienst *Marc*, namelijk met het oog op de organisatie van droppingsoperaties. De studie eindigt met een analyse van de financiering van de Dienst.

Etienne VERHOEYEN, *The «Marc» Information Network (1942-1944). Part II.*

In the first part of his study, devoted to one of the most important information networks in Occupied Belgium, Etienne Verhoeyen described its genesis (initially under the name of *Lucl*, its reorganisation by Max Londot in October 1942, its structure and operation and the changes which these underwent as a result of arrests and of interventions by *Maud* (the Belgian *Sûreté* in London and MI.6, better known as the Secret Intelligence Service). In this first part of his study, Verhoeyen also sought to construct a socio-professional profile of three groups of agents of *Marc*. In this second part, he considers the nature of the information requested and collected and the mode of its transmission to London. He illustrates also the purpose of the intense radio-telegraph communications between London and *Marc*, notably in order to organise parachute operations. Finally, the study concludes with an analysis of the financing of the network.

Luc VANDEWEYER, *L'évacuation de la population civile en 1940. Nouvelles données concernant la politique gouvernementale.*

La population belge fut, au printemps et à l'été de 1940, massivement impliquée dans l'exode. Il n'est pas tout à fait exact de dire que les autorités belges, en l'occurrence le ministère de la Santé publique, dirigé par M.-H. Jaspar, ne tentèrent pas de canaliser le flot. L'appareil administratif ne put mener cette tâche à bien en raison, surtout, de la rapidité surprenante des événements militaires.

Si l'année 1940 est devenue une année cruciale dans l'histoire politique de la Belgique, c'est aux réfugiés qu'elle le doit. Le problème des réfugiés fut l'un des éléments qui approfondirent et durcirent la «question royale». Après l'invasion allemande, les réfugiés furent un argument utilisé par Léopold III pour justifier la capitulation et par le gouvernement pour justifier la poursuite de la lutte.

L'expérience de l'exode de 1940 fut, pour une partie importante de l'élite politique belge, l'un des éléments qui conduisirent à rejeter la neutralité, à opter avec conviction pour une alliance militaire intégrée et à s'engager dans le processus de l'unité européenne. Ces options devaient relever du consensus minimal qui fut nécessaire pour assurer la viabilité politique de la Belgique après la guerre. C'était vital à une époque où la question royale faisait dangereusement converger les trois axes de rupture traditionnels, le communautaire, le philosophique et le socio-économique. Finalement, l'abdication de Léopold III désamorça la bombe. Les millions de réfugiés de mai 1940 perdirent de vue l'ampleur de leur rôle dans la dramatisation de la question royale et dans la mutation, à terme, de la Belgique en vecteur de la collaboration entre les démocraties occidentales.

Luc VANDEWEYER, *The Evacuation of the Civilian Population in 1940: New Material concerning Government Policy.*

In the spring and summer of 1940 a considerable proportion of the Belgian population participated in the exodus to France. It is not strictly correct to state that the Belgian authorities, and in particular the Ministry of Public Health directed by M.-H. Jaspard, did not attempt to channel this flow of refugees. The administrative machine was not able to succeed in doing so because, especially, of the unexpected rapidity of military developments.

If 1940 has become a crucial year in the political history of Belgium, it is because of these refugees. The problem of the refugees was one of the elements which aggravated and deepened the royal crisis. After the German invasion, the existence of the refugees was an argument used by Leopold III to justify his capitulation to the German armies and by the Belgian government to justify the continuation of the military struggle.

Their experience of the exodus in 1940 was for a significant part of the Belgian political elite one of the elements which led them to reject neutrality and to opt with conviction for an integrated military alliance as well as to participate in the process of European unification. These options were to form part of the minimum consensus which was essential to ensure the political viability of Belgium after the Second World War. It was of crucial importance at a time when the royal question was bringing about a dangerous convergence of the three traditional conflicts (linguistic, ideological and socio-economic) within Belgian society. Finally, the abdication of Leopold III defused this potential explosion and the millions of refugees of May 1940 lost sight of the extent of their role in the dramatisation of the royal crisis and in the evolution of Belgium in time into one element of the process of cooperation between the western democracies.

Jean DUJARDIN †, *De inlichtingendienst «Boucle» (1942-1944).*

In de niet-geklasseerde papieren van wijlen Jean Dujardin ontdekte Etienne Verhoeyen een kant en klaar artikel over de Inlichtingendienst *Boucle*, die van mei 1942 tot september 1944 werd geleid door Albert Krott. Geboortig uit het duitstalig gedeelte van België sprak Krott vlot Duits. Hij kon dus zendingen doen in het Derde Rijk waar hij tot driemaal toe verbleef. Hij begaf zich zelfs naar Tsjechoslovakije vanwaar hij, als ingenieur, kostbare technische en economische informatie uit meebracht. Het is echter in België dat de Dienst zijn mooiste prestatie zou leveren door de Britten de inlichtingen te verschaffen waardoor ze het kontrolestation van de nachtjagers te Lantin, nabij Luik, konden neutraliseren. Het artikel van Dujardin, dat gebaseerd is op de door A. Krott zelf en door zijn secretaresse ter beschikking van het Centrum gestelde archieven van de Dienst, beschrijft voornamelijk de werking van de Dienst, zijn relaties met Londen en met de *Poste Central* van de Belgische Staatsveiligheid in Frankrijk, waarvan *Boucle* afhing voor het overbrengen van zijn berichten

en soms zelfs voor zijn radiomededelingen. Inderdaad, van alle Inlichtingendiensten was *Boucle* de enige die niet over een radio-operateur beschikte (behalve een, in augustus 1944, hetzij na meer dan twee jaar activiteiten).

Jean DUJARDIN †, *The «Boucle» Information Network (1942-1944)*.

Etienne Verhoeyen has discovered among the unclassified papers of Jean Dujardin a completed article on the *Boucle* information network which was directed from May 1942 to September 1944 by Albert Krott. Born in the German-speaking area of Belgium, Krott spoke German fluently. He was therefore able to carry out missions within the Third Reich which he visited on three occasions. His travels even led him to Czechoslovakia from where, as a trained engineer, he brought back valuable technical and economic information. But it was in Belgium that the network achieved its greatest success in providing the British with the information which enabled them to neutralise the control station for night fighters at Lantin near Liège. Based on the archives of the network placed at the disposition of the Centre by A. Krott himself and his secretary, the article of Dujardin describes for the most part the functioning of the network, its links with London and with the «central post» of the Belgian *Sûreté* in France, on which the network depended for the transmission of its mail and sometimes even for its radio traffic. In effect, of the information networks, *Boucle* was the only one not to possess a radio operator (apart from one in August 1944, after more than two years of its operation).

Frank CAESTECKER, *L'armée polonaise en exil et la communauté polonaise en Belgique neutre (septembre 1939-mai 1940)*.

Suite à l'invasion de la Pologne en septembre 1939 et à la constitution conséquente d'une armée polonaise en exil en France, la communauté polonaise en Belgique se vit engager à une nouvelle émigration vers la France ou vers l'Allemagne et ce, respectivement, par les autorités polonaises et les autorités allemandes. Des deux côtés on mit en place une machine de propagande destinée à amener les émigrés à quitter la Belgique. En effet, ces émigrants pouvaient être enrôlés dans l'armée ou intégrés à l'économie de guerre.

En conséquence d'intérêts économiques (la plupart des Polonais étaient occupés dans les mines belges) et de la politique de neutralité, les autorités belges n'autorisèrent pas purement et simplement le départ des Polonais. 1.500 à 2.000 Polonais seulement se firent inscrire dans l'armée polonaise et une petite centaine répondit à l'appel des nazis. Le gros des Polonais demeura cependant en Belgique et y vécut l'invasion allemande de mai 1940.

Le départ pour la France était, pour beaucoup d'émigrés polonais, une expression de patriotisme. Le séjour hors de la patrie remontait souvent à plusieurs générations, mais, néanmoins, beaucoup d'émigrés demeuraient attachés à leur identité polonaise.

A cet égard, l'expérience belge semble avoir eu une influence en un sens négatif. Pour beaucoup de Polonais, l'engagement dans l'armée polonaise en exil fut également une issue à un avenir sans perspectives.

Frank CAESTECKER, *The Polish Army in exile and the Polish community in Belgium during the period of neutrality (September 1939-May 1940)*.

Following the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the subsequent creation of a Polish army in exile in France, the Polish community in Belgium found itself confronted by the prospect of a new emigration, this time to either France or Germany. Both the Polish authorities in exile in France and the German authorities established propaganda machines designed to encourage the *émigrés* to leave Belgium either to enrol in the new army in exile or in order to become part of the German war economy.

Because of economic considerations (the majority of the Poles were employed in the Belgian mining industry) and the policy of diplomatic neutrality, the Belgian authorities did not, however, permit the simple departure of Polish emigrants. Only 1,500 to 2,000 Poles succeeded in enrolling in the Polish army in France while a mere 100 responded to the propaganda of the Nazis. The vast majority remained in Belgium and experienced the German invasion of the country in May 1940.

Emigration to France was for many of the Polish *émigrés* an expression of patriotism. In many cases they had been resident outside their homeland for many generations but nevertheless many *émigrés* remained attached to their Polish identity. In this respect, their experiences in Belgium appear to have had a negative influence. Their engagement in the Polish army in exile was nevertheless for many Poles equally an escape to a future without hope.